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Abstract
Intrinsic motivation of workers may arise from diﬀerent individ-
ual motives. While some workers care about the mission of an or-
ganization and derive an intrinsic beneﬁt from advancing this mission
(“good”workers), others derive pleasure from some form of destructive
or anti-social behavior (“bad”workers). We show that mission-oriented
organizations can take advantage of the intrinsic motivation of good
workers. Compared to proﬁt-oriented organizations, lower bonus pay-
ments and lower monitoring are necessary in order to achieve a high
output. However, as soon as there are bad workers, mission-oriented
organizations may become more vulnerable to their anti-social behav-
ior than proﬁt-oriented organizations. We analyze the optimal wage
contracts and monitoring levels for both types of organization and dis-
cuss appropriate measures of ex ante candidate screening to overcome
the problems caused by bad workers.
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11 Introduction
In this paper, we analyze how diﬀerent sources of intrinsic motivation of
workers may aﬀect labor management and the production outcomes both in
for-proﬁt and nonproﬁt organizations.
Most theoretical models on intrinsic motivation suppose that it arises if work-
ers derive a beneﬁt from doing good - what is often referred to as“warm glow”
utility - or when workers are interested in a certain goal or mission, like for ex-
ample helping the poor or protecting the environment. An organization that
is dedicated to such a mission may ﬁnd it easier and cheaper to attract work-
ers pursuing similar goals. Intrinsic motivation is hence treated by economists
as something generally beneﬁcial to organizations. However, other aspects
of a job may also instil intrinsic motivation in certain types of workers. And
these other aspects are not necessarily beneﬁcial for the employer. Take the
following example: helping refugees is the kind of mission-oriented work that
is likely to attract workers interested in this mission (what we will refer to as
“good”motivated workers). But such a job also involves working in a remote
location with little control from the outside. Circumstances such as these
may also attract workers with quite diﬀerent intentions (what we will call
“bad” workers), as has been illustrated by the United Nations sex-for-food
scandal, which was exposed by “Save the Children”, a UK-based nonproﬁt
organization: it showed that in 2006 aid workers were systematically abusing
minors in a refugee camp in Liberia, selling food for sex with girls as young
as 8.1
Unfortunately, more or less extreme examples for destructive or anti-social
behavior such as this abound: For instance, the Catholic Church is quite
obviously an organization that relies on the high intrinsic motivation of its
workers, but, as illustrated by the recent scandals of abuse by Catholic priests
in the US, has been recurrently targeted by bad workers.2 Similarly a py-
romaniac may best be able to satisfy his urge for ﬁre, while minimizing his
risk of being discovered, by working for the ﬁreﬁghters, with the added ad-
1See the report by Save the Children UK (2006). Similar cases have since been reported
from Southern Sudan, Burundi, Ivory Coast, East Timor, Congo, Cambodia, Bosnia and
Haiti (see“The U.N. sex-for-food scandal”, Washington Times, Tuesday, May 9, 2006 and
the report by Save the Children UK (2008)).
2The John Jay report (see Terry (2008)) indicated that some 11,000 allegations of
sexual abuse of children had been made against 4,392 priests in the USA. This number
constituted approximately 4% of the 110,000 priests who had served during the 52-year
period covered by the study (1950-2002). The report found that “the problem was indeed
widespread and aﬀected more than 95 percent of the dioceses”.
2vantage of being perceived as a hero.3 A sadist might try to work in prisons
or detention centers, preferably protected by national security secrecy or by
their geographical remoteness, to feed his need to humiliate and harm oth-
ers.4 A pedophile, who derives some intrinsic beneﬁt from working in a job
where he is in close contact with children, will target vulnerable children,
such as refugees or orphans, simply because they are less likely to expose
him. Other examples of anti-social behavior in non-proﬁts are presented in
Gibelman and Gelman (2004) who summarize some recent scandals involving
US and International non-government organizations (NGOs).5 Finally, anti-
social behaviors are not the monopoly of non-proﬁt organizations. They are
also found in for-proﬁts. For instance, a terrorist might want to work in an
airport to have a privileged access to planes. Or an industrial spy would be
interested in jobs in ﬁrms where he is likely to get access to a lot of sensitive
information, while his risk of being discovered is low.
We therefore face a situation where there are diﬀerent sources of intrinsic
motivation which may aﬀect the production outcome both in the mission- and
the proﬁt-oriented sector. To capture this problem, we assume that there are
three types of workers, who care for diﬀerent things: regular workers only
care about monetary incentives, good workers care about money and the
mission of the organization, and bad workers care about money and whether
they can do things they like, but which are harmful to the organization or
society. We then consider two sectors of the economy, one proﬁt-oriented and
one mission-oriented. As in Besley and Ghatak (2005), on which our model
is based, we assume that in the nonproﬁt sector, organizations are structured
around some mission, for example providing public services, or catering to the
needs of disadvantaged groups of society.6 These organizations may attract
3Stambaugh and Styron (2003) give an overview over the problem of arson among ﬁre-
ﬁghters and provide evidence, mostly from the United States, showing that the problem is
very serious. Similar cases have been documented elsewhere, see for example http://www.
lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/pompier-pyromane-2-ans-de-prison_459032.
html, or http://www.swiss-firefighters.ch/News-file-article-sid-3427.html.
4As examples, see the Stanford experiment on prison (see http://www.prisonexp.
org/) and the torture Abu Ghraib scandal (see for instance http://www.time.com/time/
magazine/article/0,9171,1025139,00.html).
5“Bad” actions by NGO employees mentioned in the paper by Gibelman and Gelman
(2004) include questionable fund raising practices, mismanagement, embezzlement, theft,
money laundering, “personal lifestyle enhancement” and kickbacks, corruption, as well as
sexual misconduct.
6We use the terms mission-oriented and nonproﬁt organization equivalently since we be-
lieve them to be largely congruent in reality. However, there are cases where organizations
do not have the legal status of a nonproﬁt, but still follow a mission. This has recently been
highlighted by the discussion on corporate social responsibility as discussed, for instance,
3workers who care about this speciﬁc mission and derive an intrinsic beneﬁt
from their work. They can hence oﬀer lower extrinsic incentives and still
attract motivated workers. We further generalize the approach by Besley
and Ghatak (2005) by introducing“bad”workers and adding monitoring as an
additional choice variable of the employer in order to deal with the diﬀerent
incentive issues raised by the presence of diﬀerent kinds of workers: while
monitoring reinforces the eﬀort incentives of good and regular workers, it
makes “bad”actions or anti-social behavior less attractive as it increases the
chances of getting caught and being punished.
Given this setup, we ﬁrst consider the case with only good and regular work-
ers and ﬁnd the classic result that the mission-oriented sector oﬀers lower
wages and makes less use of monitoring than the proﬁt-oriented sector. We
then introduce bad workers who derive utility from behaving in an anti-social
way. It turns out that proﬁt-oriented organizations are a priori less vulner-
able to such behavior. Bad workers may behave like regular workers in the
proﬁt-oriented sector and thus be totally undistinguishable from “normal”
people. By contrast, if they join the mission-oriented sector, then only in
order to follow their destructive instincts. The more organizations in this
sector rely on the intrinsic motivation of good workers and the less they
make use of monetary incentives and control, the more likely they are to
become the target of bad workers. We then analyze how contracts have to
change in both sectors in order to deter bad workers from their destructive
behavior. However, deterrence is costly as it implies higher monitoring, and
it even may become entirely ineﬀective for workers with very high levels of
bad motivation. We therefore also consider ex ante measures of candidate
selection, which may help to reduce the occurrence of anti-social behavior.
Psychologists have long recognized and studied anti-social behavior. One
strand of the literature, as well as most traditional psychiatry, focuses on
so-called internal determinants. Anti-social behaviors, perceived as a pathol-
ogy, are explained by individual predispositions such as genetics, personality
traits, or pathological risk factors rooted in childhood. Another strand of
the literature focuses on external determinants. It aims to explain how “or-
dinary”people can be induced to behave in evil ways by situational variables
(see Zimbardo, 2004).7 Our paper is consistent with both views. While it
takes the level of bad motivation as exogenous, it depends on the incentives
in B´ enabou and Tirole (2009). For a further discussion of mission- vs. proﬁt-oriented
organizations, see also Besley and Ghatak (2005).
7For instance, in a famous experiment on obedience to authority, Milgram (1974) has
shown that two thirds of the subjects were willing to inﬂict lethal electrical shocks to total
strangers.
4given by an organization whether bad workers will indeed act in an anti-social
way or whether they will behave just like regular workers.
By introducing bad workers, we contribute to the literature on intrinsic mo-
tivation and its eﬀects on agents’ behavior which has received increasing
attention in recent years.8 Furthermore, or model is linked to the growing
strand of literature on public service motivation9 and its implications for
hiring and remuneration schemes, as for example Francois (2000), Francois
(2002), Prendergast (2007) and, in particular, Delfgaauw and Dur (2008). As
in our paper, workers in this literature show some form of intrinsic motivation
when working in a certain sector or for a particular mission.10 For instance,
Prendergast (2007) shows that intrinsically motivated agents in the public
sector should be biased either against of in favor of their clients, depending
on circumstances.11 As in our paper, he ﬁnds that sometimes the wrong peo-
ple will be drawn to a certain job even though otherwise the paper’s focus is
quite diﬀerent.
Furthermore, our model is closely related to the paper by Besley and Ghatak
(2005) who show that matching the mission preferences of principals and
agents can enhance organizational eﬃciency and reduces the need for high-
powered incentives. There are hence many sectors where wages are not paid
conditional on performance, as for instance the civil service sector or many
nonproﬁt organizations.12 Nonproﬁts sometimes are even legally forbidden
to pay incentive wages; see, for instance, the discussion in Glaeser (2002).
Depending on the sector, this may have institutional reasons, as for exam-
ple in the judicial sector, where economic incentives are minimized in order
to guarantee high quality independent judgement (Posner, 1993). In other
cases, especially in the case of development aid, performance may just be too
diﬃcult to assess due to high costs of monitoring in the ﬁeld. This may lead
to shirking and absenteeism as has been analyzed for example by Chaudhury,
8See, for example, B´ enabou and Tirole (2003), Frey (1997), Murdock (2002) and Akerlof
and Kranton (2005). The eﬀects of employees’ intrinsic motivation on ﬁrm performance
are discussed by Kreps (1997).
9See Dixit (2002) for a review on incentives in the public sector.
10Note, however, that from a technical point of view some of these models are quite
diﬀerent from ours. In Francois (2000), for instance, all workers care for overall output
and have no particular preference for the public sector. Diﬀerences between the two sectors
only come into play through diﬀerences in property rights.
11That this may indeed be the case has been shown by Heckman, Smith, and Taber
(1996) in an empirical study on training programs. Bureaucrats tended to select applicants
with lower expected earnings into their training program, even though this negatively
aﬀected their own payoﬀ.
12See also Borzaga and Tortia (2006) and Ballou and Weisbrod (2003) for empirical
studies on the incentives in for-proﬁt and diﬀerent forms of nonproﬁt organizations.
5Hammer, Kremer, Muralidharan, and Rogers (2006) and Banerjee and Duﬂo
(2006). However workers may not only just work less. They may also behave
in a way that damages the organization for which they work or which is out-
right criminal. To prevent such destructive behaviors, nonproﬁts therefore
may want to engage in a more sophisticated selection process of candidates.
The diﬃculties of such a process have, for instance, been discussed in Gold-
man (1982) and Greenberg and Haley (1986) for the selection of judges.
The following section outlines the basic model with only good and regular
workers. We then introduce bad workers in Section 3 and show how the
optimal contracts have to change. Section 4 discusses the ex ante selection
of job candidates, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Basic Setup
There are two sectors i = F,N, where F stands for for-proﬁt or proﬁt-
oriented and N for nonproﬁt or mission-oriented. Furthermore, there are
three types of agents j = g,r,b, where g stands for good, r for regular and
b for bad workers, with shares xg + xr + xb = 1 in the population. As a
benchmark case, we ﬁrst concentrate on good and regular workers only. In
contrast to regular agents, good agents derive an intrinsic beneﬁt θg > 0 from
working in the nonproﬁt sector N. In sector F, neither type of agent r or g
derives a positive intrinsic beneﬁt.
Each agent produces a basic output q and, depending on his eﬀort e, an
additional output ∆q with probability e. His eﬀort cost is c(e) = a · e2/2.
In order to induce agent j to work harder, the principal in sector i can oﬀer
him a contract consisting of a basic wage wij plus a bonus payment tij ≥ 0 if
a high output is observed. However, the principal only observes the agent’s
output with probability mi, where mi is the monitoring level in sector i.
The cost of monitoring is M(mi). We assume that mi ∈ {0,[m,1]}, i.e.,
the principal can choose not to monitor or else he has to choose at least a
minimum level of monitoring m > 0. As will become clear later on, in most
cases the principal will want to set the monitoring level as low as possible.
This result is similar to Becker (1968). For the sake of clarity we therefore
introduce a minimum monitoring level m. The idea is that there is some ﬁxed
cost to monitoring. For example, the principal may have to hire at least one
employee for the task.
We assume that there is a limited liability constraint such that the agent
has to receive at least a monetary payoﬀ of w ≥ 0. Furthermore, the agent’s
6outside utility is assumed to be ¯ uj ≥ 0. Given these constraints, the principals
in both sectors try to maximize their proﬁts over wij, tij and mi as follows:
πij = q + (∆q − mitij)eij − wij − M(mi) , (1)
subject to the following constraints
(LL) wij ≥ w , (2)
(PC) uij = wij + (mitij + θij)eij − ae
2
ij/2 ≥ ¯ uj , (3)
(IC) eij = arg max
e∈[0,1]
 




It follows immediately from the incentive constraint (4) that the agent will
choose his optimal eﬀort level as eij = (mitij + θij)/a. We assume that a is
suﬃciently large to make sure that we get an interior solution eij ≤ 1:
Assumption 1 a ≥ ∆q + max{θg,θb}.
Under Assumption 1, we can rewrite the maximization problem as
max
wij,tij,mi
πij = q + (∆q − mitij)
mitij + θij
a
− wij − M(mi) ,
subject to
(LL) wij ≥ w ,
(PC) uij = (mitij + θij)
2/(2a) + wij ≥ ¯ uj .
We aim to study cases where in the absence of intrinsic motivation, inducing
eﬀort has some value to the principal. This requires that the cost of monitor-
ing is not too high compared to the beneﬁt:
1
4a∆q2 ≥ M(m). Moreover, we
concentrate on outcomes with non-negative payoﬀs for the principal which is
assured by q − w − M(m) > 0. The following assumption assures that the
solutions derived in the paper are hence optimal:
Assumption 2 ∆q2 ≥ 4aM(m) and q > w + M(m).
Let us deﬁne vij as the reservation payoﬀ level such that for ¯ uj ≥ vij the
participation constraint of agent j becomes binding and ˜ vij as the level of
7outside utility where the agent’s limited liability constraint ceases to be bind-
ing. Furthermore, let ¯ vij be deﬁned as the level of reservation payoﬀ of agent

















2 + q − M(m) .
It is straightforward to check that under Assumption 2: vij ≤ ˜ vij ≤ ¯ vij.
Then the following proposition characterizes the optimal contract:




ij) between a principal in sector i and an agent of type j given a
reservation payoﬀ ¯ uj ∈ [0,¯ vij] exists and has the following features:





w if ¯ uj ∈ [0, ˜ vij]
¯ uj −
1
2a(∆q + θij)2 if ¯ uj ∈ [˜ vij, ¯ vij]
,
(b) The monitoring level is set at the minimum level whenever extrinsic
incentives are necessary, i.e., m∗
i = m when tij > 0, and is zero other-
wise.







max{0,(∆q − θij)/(2m)} if ¯ uj ∈ [0,vij]
(
 
2a(¯ uj − w) − θij)/m if ¯ uj ∈ [vij,˜ vij]
∆q/m if ¯ uj ∈ [˜ vij, ¯ vij]
.
All proofs can be found in the Appendix.
We can thus discern three cases:
• Case I: The limited liability constraint is binding, but not the partic-
ipation constraint of the agent. This corresponds to a case where w
is relatively high compared to ¯ uj. In other words, this holds for low
values of the reservation utility: ¯ uj ∈ [0,vij]. The optimal contract in
this case is described by w∗
ij = w, t∗
ij = max{0,(∆q − θij)/(2m)}, and
m∗
i = m if t∗
ij > 0 and zero otherwise.













2a + q − M(m)
∆q




Figure 1: Optimal contract depending on ¯ u and θij.
• Case II: Both the limited liability and the participation constraint are
binding . This holds for intermediary values of the reservation utility:






2a(¯ uj − w) −θij, and m∗
ij = m if m∗
it∗
ij > 0 and 0 otherwise.
• Case III: The participation constraint is binding, but not the limited
liability constraint. This corresponds to a case where ¯ uj is relatively
high, i.e., for ¯ uj ∈ [˜ vij,¯ vij]. The optimal contract in this case is de-
scribed by w∗
ij = ¯ uj − (∆q + θij)2/(2a), m∗
i = m and t∗
ij = ∆q/m.
Which case is relevant for the principal depends on the agent’s outside option
¯ uj and his level of intrinsic motivation θij. Figure 1 gives an overview.
The ﬁrst two cases are the cases described in Besley and Ghatak (2005).
The reason why the third case is not relevant in Besley and Ghatak’s (2005)
model is that they do not have a basic payoﬀ q which accrues to the principal
even if the agent makes no special eﬀort. As a consequence, whenever the
incentive scheme is not proﬁtable because the agent’s outside option is too
high, then no contract can be made. Here, by contrast, the principal can
fulﬁll the agent’s participation condition even for higher outside options (i.e.,
¯ uj > w +∆q2/2a, that is the area above the horizontal dotted line in Figure
91) because the resulting costs are still covered by the basic production payoﬀ
q.
In the following, we will discuss in more detail how Proposition 1 translates
into an optimal contract in each of the two sectors N and F.
2.1 For-Proﬁt Sector
Let us ﬁrst consider the implications of Proposition 1 for the proﬁt-oriented
sector. The principal in the proﬁt-oriented sector cannot rely on worker’s
intrinsic motivation (i.e., θFj = 0) and hence always has to provide suﬃcient
extrinsic incentives. In particular, he always has to invest in monitoring. As
a corollary from Proposition 1 we then get the following:
Corollary 1 : Depending on the size of the agent’s reservation utility, we
can discern the following cases:
• Case I: For ¯ u ∈ [0,vF], the optimal contract in F is given by
w
∗
F = w , m
∗
F = m , t
∗
F = ∆q/(2m) ;
• Case II: For ¯ u ∈ [vF,˜ vF], the optimal contract in F is given by
w
∗
F = w , m
∗




2a(¯ u − w)/m ;
• Case III: For ¯ u ∈ [˜ vF,¯ vF], the optimal contract in F is given by
w
∗
F = ¯ u − ∆q
2/(2a) , m
∗
F = m , t
∗
F = ∆q/m ;
where
vF = ∆q
2/(8a) + w ,
˜ vF = ∆q
2/(2a) + w ,
¯ vF = ∆q
2/(2a) + q − M(m) .
As a consequence, the utility of a worker, no matter whether good or regular,
in sector F in case I hence is uF = w + ∆q2/(8a). In cases II and III it is
equal to ¯ u.
The principal’s payoﬀ is









(2a(¯ u − w))
 
(2a(¯ u − w) − w in case II
1
2a∆q2 − ¯ u in case III
.
102.2 Non-Proﬁt Sector
In contrast to the proﬁt-oriented sector, the mission-oriented sector N can
save on wage costs by exploiting the intrinsic motivation of “good” workers.
By oﬀering a lower basic wage and/or lower eﬀort incentives, N can still
attract good workers (i.e., with θNg ≥ 0) whereas regular workers will prefer
their outside option or work in F.
Suppose the level of intrinsic motivation of good workers is θNg ≡ θg. Then
we get the following corollary from Proposition 1 for the non-proﬁt sector:
Corollary 2 : Depending on the size of the agent’s outside option, the op-
timal contract between a “good” agent and the principal in sector N is char-
acterized as follows:
• Case I: For ¯ u ∈ [0,vN], we get two subcases:
(a) If θg is low, i.e., if θg < ∆q (case Ia in Fig. 1), then the optimal
contract is given by
w
∗
N = w , m
∗
N = m , t
∗
N = (∆q − θg)/(2m)
(b) If θg is high, i.e., if θg > ∆q (case Ib in Fig. 1), then
w
∗
N = w , m
∗
N = 0 , t
∗
N = 0
• Case II: If ¯ u ∈ [vN,˜ vN], then the optimal contract is given by
w∗




2a(¯ u − w) − θg),
m∗
N = m , if t∗
N > 0 and m∗
N = 0 otherwise .
• Case III: If ¯ u ∈ [˜ vN,¯ vN], then the optimal contract is given by
w
∗
N = ¯ u − (∆q + θg)
2/(2a) , m
∗
N = m , t
∗


















2 + q − M(m) .
11The utility of a motivated agent in cases II and III corresponds to his reser-
vation utility ¯ u, whereas in case I he gets





g if ∆q < θg
(∆q + θg)2/4 if ∆q ≥ θg
,
which is higher or equal to what he would get in sector F. “Good” agents
with low reservation utility hence prefer the contract proposed in Corollary
2 to the contract oﬀered in sector F. Low reservation utility typically cor-
responds to junior workers with no or little experience and thus relatively
low outside opportunity. We thus expect young idealistic people to join the
nonproﬁt sector. Empirically they should be over-represented compared to
other workers.
Regular agents, on the other hand, do not derive any intrinsic satisfaction
from working in the mission-oriented sector, but only care about monetary







F. As a consequence, the utility of a regular worker
under the above contract is always smaller than the utility level he can reach
under the contract proposed in sector F.
As a result, regular workers will choose to work in sector F and “good”
motivated workers will prefer to work in sector N.
The principal’s proﬁt in case I hence is








− M(m) if ∆q ≥ θg
.
In case II, it is
πN = q +
1
a
(∆q + θg −
 
(2a(¯ u − w))
 
(2a(¯ u − w) − w − M(m) ,
and in case III









By exploiting the intrinsic motivation of “good”workers, the principal in N
can hence save on wage and monitoring costs relative to sector F by oﬀering
lower incentives and making less use of monitoring.14 Indeed, comparing πN
14A nonproﬁt does not make any proﬁts by deﬁnition. So while we sometimes refer to πN
and πF as proﬁt, it rather measures the relation between personnel costs and production.
If the nonproﬁt has to spend less on its workers, this eases its budget constraint and
makes more funds available for other things. This becomes particularly relevant if we take
into account that many nonproﬁts are ﬁnanced by donations and may have to run their
operations on a rather tight budget.
12with πF in each case, it is straightforward to see that πN > πF if θg > 0.
Moreover, in contrast to sector F, principals in sector N may not need to
monitor their workers at all: If θg > ∆q, workers are motivated enough to
provide eﬀort even if there is no extrinsic incentive and no monitoring.
3 Bad Motivation
So far we have considered the case where intrinsic motivation is necessarily
good for the ﬁrm. However, this may not always be true. Workers may
pursue their own private beneﬁt to the detriment of the organization they
work for. We model this by allowing workers to choose a “destructive eﬀort”
d ∈ [0,1] rather than the“normal”eﬀort e considered so far. There are some
workers who get a private beneﬁt θb from choosing such a negative eﬀort,
and by doing so they may cause a damage D to the ﬁrm they are working
for. We denote the probability that a job candidate in sector i = F,N is a
“bad”type as βi.
Consider the following utility function for bad workers in sector i = F,N:
uib = wi +
 
mitie − ae2/2 if e ≥ 0
(θb − miK)d − ad2/2 if d ≥ 0 ,
where K is an exogenous punishment that can be imposed on a worker if
a negative eﬀort is observed. The idea behind this is that a negative eﬀort
corresponds not just to shirking but is an outright act of sabotage which can
be treated as a criminal oﬀense and hence can be punished by a ﬁne or a
prison term. However, as this is beyond the inﬂuence of the ﬁrm, we treat
the punishment as exogenous.
Note that the worker chooses either one of the two options, i.e., he either
decides to satisfy his destructive impulse and get intrinsic satisfaction from
doing so (d ≥ 0). Or he behaves like a regular worker, chooses e ≥ 0 and
aims at getting monetary rewards.
As can be seen from this utility function, bad guys may be willing to make
a “good”eﬀort if given the right incentives.
Taking into account the worker’s optimal eﬀort choice, which under Assump-
tion 1 is still lower than 1 (i.e., there is an interior solution), we can rewrite
his expected utility as
uib = wi +
 
(miti)2/(2a) if e ≥ 0
(θb − miK)2/(2a) if d ≥ 0
.
13Bad types therefore prefer to exert a positive eﬀort rather than to follow their
destructive impulse and sabotage if
miti ≥ θb − miK . (5)
In the following, we ﬁrst analyze how a bad worker’s choice between sector
N and F is determined before we look at the implications of this choice for
the optimal contracts in each sector.
3.1 Automatic Deterrence of Bad Workers
In this section, we analyze the behavior of bad workers for a given set of
contracts, namely the optimal contracts derived in the previous section. This
also allows us to determine under what circumstances organizations in sectors
N and F have to adapt their incentive schemes to the presence of bad workers
and when there is“automatic”deterrence of anti-social behavior, i.e., without
any change in the optimal contracts.
Suppose, for the moment, that the contracts in both sectors stay as calculated
in Section 2, i.e., that they are not adapted to the presence of“bad”workers.
How will bad workers behave under these circumstances? When will they
opt for sector N, when for sector F?
To answer these questions, we need to compare a bad worker’s payoﬀ from
choosing eﬀort e or d in both sectors given the optimal contracts derived in
Section 2. This comparison shows that for a given reservation utility ¯ u the
incentive for choosing a positive eﬀort e are always higher in F than in N,
i.e., uFb(e) > uNb(e). At the same time, the monitoring level in N is always
smaller or equal than that in sector F, thus making it less likely to get caught
with bad actions in the nonproﬁt sector and therefore uNb(d) ≥ uFb(d). From
this follows:
Corollary 3 : Under the optimal contracts as proposed in Proposition 1,
“bad”workers never join the mission-oriented sector to do good, i.e., in order
to provide a positive eﬀort e.
That is, bad workers will only join N to follow their destructive impulse,
while minimizing the risk of being detected and punished.
Next, let us look in more detail at what happens in each sector. It is clear
from (5) that for low levels of negative motivation θb, bad workers are better
oﬀ if they choose a positive rather than a destructive eﬀort. In sector F, such
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Figure 2: Automatic Deterrence in Sector F.
“automatic” deterrence of bad workers, i.e., deterrence without any change






∆q/2 + mK if ¯ u ∈ [0,vF]  
2a(¯ u − w) + mK if ¯ u ∈ [vF, ˜ vF]
∆q + mK if ¯ u ∈ [˜ vF,¯ vF]
, (6)
where vF, ˜ vF,¯ vF are deﬁned as in Corollary 1. If the above holds true, then a
bad worker’s payoﬀ from choosing a “normal”eﬀort e is anyway higher than
his payoﬀ from choosing a destructive eﬀort d in F. As shown in Figure 2, bad
workers with θb < ˜ θb are therefore “automatically” deterred from anti-social
behavior.
Next, let us consider what happens in the nonproﬁt sector N. Bad workers
will be discouraged from joining this sector as long as uNb(d) ≤ uFb(e).15
Automatic deterrence, i.e. deterrence of bad workers without any change in
the optimal contract (m∗
N,t∗
N,w∗














i.e., for all θb smaller than
˜ ˜ θb ≡
 
2a(wF − w∗
N) + (mFtF)2 + m
∗
NK . (8)
15That this is the relevant comparison follows from Corollary 3.
15In order to determine the exact level of ˜ ˜ θb, we then have to insert the optimal
contracts in N and F into equation (8). For the sake of shortness, we will
skip this exercise here. The interested reader may however ﬁnd the detailed
calculations in the Appendix. The results are also shown in Figure 3 which
depicts the level of automatic deterrence in the nonproﬁt sector, ˜ ˜ θb, as a
black curve. For (¯ u,θb)-combinations below this curve, bad workers prefer
to work either in sector F or enjoy their outside utility ¯ u. Furthermore, the
level of automatic deterrence in sector F, ˜ θb, is also featured in Figure 3 and
is depicted as a dashed gray line. This allows us to see immediately that,
depending on the exact values of θg, θb and ¯ u, sector N is either better or
worse protected from destructive behavior than sector F:
• For ¯ u > ¯ vF, i.e., for very high levels of reservation utility, F can no
longer oﬀer contracts that would satisfy the worker’s participation con-
straint and at the same time yield a positive payoﬀ to the ﬁrm. There-
fore, nonproﬁt organizations are the only possible employer for agents
with such a high reservation utility. But even working in N is relatively
unattractive due to rather low basic wages. Bad workers will therefore
prefer to enjoy their outside utility ¯ u and only the most motivated will
ﬁnd it worthwhile to work at all. As a result, the level of deterrence in
sector N for ¯ u > ¯ vF is rather high, as can be seen both from 3(a) and
3(b).
• A more relevant scenario is one where ¯ u ≤ ¯ vF, i.e. the outside utility of
the agents is such that both types of organizations may attract workers.
Let us ﬁrst consider what happens if θg < ∆q as shown in Figure 3(a).
For such low levels of intrinsic motivation of good workers, the level
of automatic deterrence is the same in sector N and F because the
monitoring level is the same in both sectors. Only for ˜ vF < ¯ u ≤ ¯ vF,
automatic deterrence is slightly higher in N since the basic wage in N
is lower than in F and hence makes working in N less attractive.
• The most interesting case arises for low levels of reservation utility ¯ u
and high intrinsic motivation of good workers (θg > ∆q) as shown
in Figure 3(b). In that case, the nonproﬁt ﬁrm relies entirely on the
intrinsic motivation of good workers and hence provides no extrinsic
incentives, i.e., mN = 0 (Case Ib). The nonproﬁt ﬁrm then becomes
particularly attractive for “bad”types. They can get







∆q + θg + mK
vF ˜ vF ¯ vF
vN ˜ vN ¯ vN
˜ θb
˜ ˜ θb








∆q + θg + mK
˜ θb
vF ˜ vF ¯ vF
vN ˜ vN ¯ vN
˜ ˜ θb
(b) θg > ∆q
Figure 3: Automatic Deterrence in N. For (¯ u,θb)-combinations in the shaded
area, bad workers are automatically deterred from bad actions in sector N.
17from choosing a negative eﬀort in sector N, whereas they would get
utility
uFb(e) = w + ∆q
2/(8a) ,
from choosing a positive eﬀort in sector F. Therefore, all bad workers
with θb > ∆q/2 will opt for sector N and provide a destructive eﬀort.
Bad workers with a lower θb will choose sector F and behave like regular
workers.
The analysis in this section thus has provided us with several insights: First,
we have seen that bad workers only join sector N in order to behave in a
destructive way, whereas they may behave like regular workers in sector F.
And second, we have seen that while the low basic wages in N may act as a
deterrent for high levels of reservation utility, the nonproﬁt sector becomes
very vulnerable to anti-social behavior if it relies heavily on the intrinsic
motivation of its workers and hence does not monitor enough.
In the following, we analyze how the optimal contracts in both sectors have
to change in order to account for the presence of bad motivated workers if
there is no “automatic”deterrence.
3.2 “Bad” Workers in the Proﬁt-Oriented Sector
As we have seen in the previous section, it is not necessary to adjust the
optimal contracts described in Proposition 1 as long as the intrinsic motiva-
tion of bad workers θb is suﬃciently low. This is the case if θb is below ˜ θb as
deﬁned in (6). So, next we consider what happens if θb is higher than ˜ θb and
how the optimal contracts then should be adjusted.
To do so, we assume that organizations in the proﬁt-oriented sector do not
take into account the policy of the mission-oriented sector, whereas the latter
takes policies in the former sector as given. This is equivalent to assuming
that sector N is small compared to sector F, i.e., the share of good workers
in the population, xg, is small relative to the share of regular workers, xr.
3.2.1 Full Deterrence
If the principal wants to deter bad workers all together from being destructive,
his maximization problem becomes16
max
wF,tF,mF
πF = q + (∆q − mFtF)mFtF
1
a
− wF − M(mF) ,
16The agent’s incentive constraint is already taken into account here.
18subject to
(LL) wF ≥ w ,
(PC) (mFtF)
2/(2a) + wF ≥ ¯ uj ,
(DET) mFtF ≥ θb − mFK ,
where the last constraint is new. This deterrence constraint ensures that
bad workers prefer to make a positive rather than a destructive eﬀort. For
θb > ˜ θb the deterrence constraint becomes binding and we can hence rewrite
the principal’s maximization problem as
max
wF,mF
πF = q + (∆q − θb + mFK)(θb − mFK)
1
a
− wF − M(mF) ,
subject to
(LL) wF ≥ w , (9)
(PC) (θb − mFK)
2/(2a) + wF ≥ ¯ uj . (10)
As before, the solution of this maximization problem gives rise to three dif-
ferent cases, depending on the reservation utility of the workers. We deﬁne
vFb as the outside utility for which the modiﬁed participation constraint as
given in (10) becomes binding. Furthermore, let us deﬁne ˜ vFb as the level of
outside utility at which the limited liability constraint ceases to be binding
and ¯ vFb as the highest level of outside utility at which the for-proﬁt ﬁrm still
makes a nonnegative proﬁt. Additionally, we have to deﬁne an upper bound
for the level of negative intrinsic motivation ¯ θb: for θb > ¯ θb, the monitoring
level is equal to one and cannot increase further.
The optimal contract with full deterrence in sector F then is described by
the following proposition:




F ) in sector F given a reservation payoﬀ ¯ u ∈ [0,¯ vFb] has the
following features:





w if ¯ u ∈ [0,˜ vFb]
¯ u − 1
2a(θb − mdet
F K)2 if ¯ u ∈ [˜ vFb,¯ vFb] ,
19(b) The optimal monitoring level mdet
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2a(¯ u − w)) if ¯ u ∈ [vFb,˜ vFb] ,
m
det
F K + M
′(m
det
F )a/K = θb − ∆q if ¯ u ∈ [˜ vFb, ¯ vFb] .








Note that although we still may get three cases, depending on the outside
utility of the agents, the borders between these three cases have shifted rel-
ative to those in Corollary 1. In particular, vFb > vF, and ˜ vFb > ˜ vF, but
¯ vFb < ¯ vF. For a more detailed discussion, see the proof of Proposition 2 in
the Appendix.
Furthermore, Proposition 2 implies that, in order to fully deter bad workers
from bad actions, the principal in sector F has to raise his monitoring level
relative to the benchmark case without destructive motivation, no matter
what the outside utility of the agent, i.e. mdet
F > m∗
F. Besides, he has to





a consequence, besides deterring bad workers from bad actions, this contract
will also induce regular workers to choose a higher eﬀort level.
3.2.2 No Full Deterrence
Alternatively, the principal may accept the possibility that destructive be-
havior may occur. Let βF be the share of bad workers in sector F in this
case.17 Taking into account the agent’s optimal eﬀort choice, the principal’s
maximization problem then corresponds to
max
wF,tF,mF
πF = (1 − βF)(∆q − mFtF)
mFtF
a
− βFD(θb − mFK)
1
a
+q − wF − M(mF) ,
subject to the worker’s limited liability and participation constraint as stated
in (2) and (3).
The optimal contract then takes the following form:
17Note that βF is actually endogenous. It is deﬁned as the share of bad workers in sector
F. If, for example, all regular and all bad workers opt for sector F, then the share of bad
workers in this sector is βF = xb/(xr + xb).
20Proposition 3 : For θb > ˜ θb, the optimal contract (mnd
F ,tnd
F ,wnd
F ) in sector
F given a reservation payoﬀ ¯ u ∈ [0, ¯ vF] has the following features:





w if ¯ u ∈ [0,˜ vF]
¯ u −
1
2a∆q2 if ¯ u ∈ [˜ vF, ¯ vF]
,
(b) The monitoring level mnd
F is such that M′(mnd
F ) = βFDK/a.













F in each of the three cases. However, the transfer
level tnd
F is lower than without bad workers, whereas the monitoring level mnd
F
has increased. While the principal may not be able to prevent bad behavior,
the expected reward for such behavior thus is lower and hence the level of
destructive eﬀort chosen by the workers is lower. Therefore, the expected
damage from bad behavior goes down.
Whether the principal in sector F prefers full deterrence or whether he opts
for no full deterrence depends on his respective expected proﬁt. Under the
former regime, his expected proﬁt is
π
det














whereas in the latter case his proﬁt becomes
π
nd



















As can be seen easily from the second function, the expected proﬁt without
full deterrence is strictly decreasing in the share of bad workers in sector
F, βF, in the damage these workers may cause D and in their intrinsic
motivation θb. This means that the larger the share of bad workers in sector
F and the higher the expected damage, the more likely it is that πdet
F > πnd
F ,
i.e., that the principal in sector F will prefer to fully deter bad workers. If, for
instance, the number of regular workers in the population xr is very high, this
implies that the relative share of bad workers in sector F, βF, is low and full
deterrence hence is less attractive. Furthermore, the monitoring technology
plays a role. If the marginal cost of an increased level of monitoring is high,
then full deterrence may be too costly.
213.3 “Bad” Workers in the Mission-Oriented Sector
For low levels of “bad”motivation θb, the non-proﬁt sector is protected from
destructive behavior by the higher eﬀort incentives oﬀered in the proﬁt-
oriented sector, i.e., bad workers’ utility from choosing a normal eﬀort e
in sector F is higher than their utility from choosing a destructive eﬀort d in










The principal in the mission-oriented sector therefore does not need to adapt
his optimal wage policies (w∗
N,m∗
N,t∗
N) as deﬁned in Corollary 2 as long as
θb ≤ ˜ ˜ θb ≡
 
2a(wF − w∗
N) + (mFtF)2 + m
∗
NK ,
given a contract (wF,mF,tF) in sector F.
If the level of motivation of bad workers is higher, i.e., if θb > ˜ ˜ θb, then the
principal in sector N will have to increase his monitoring level to deter bad
workers from choosing a destructive eﬀort. However, the principal cannot
increase his monitoring level beyond mN = 1. To account for this fact and
make sure that mN ≤ 1, the following assumption is suﬃcient:
Assumption 3 θb ≤ K + ∆q/2 .
The eﬀort incentives for good workers, however, need not be aﬀected by
this change in the intensity of monitoring: in order to induce good workers
to provide eﬀort, nothing more than the optimal incentives as described in
Corollary 2 are needed.
Therefore the following proposition holds:
Proposition 4 : For ˜ ˜ θb < θb ≤ K+∆q/2, and given a contract (mF,tF,wF)
in sector F and a reservation payoﬀ ¯ u ∈ [0, ¯ vF], the principal in sector N can




with the following features:
(a) The ﬁxed wage is wdet
N = w∗
N where w∗
N as deﬁned in Corollary 2.
(b) The monitoring level is
m
det
N = (θb −
 
2a(wF − wN) + (mFtF)2)/K.




N , with m∗
Nt∗
N as deﬁned in Corol-
lary 2.
Suppose there is full deterrence in sector F. For ¯ u ∈ [0,˜ vF], i.e., if the basic
wage is the same in both sectors, N can achieve full deterrence of bad workers
by choosing the same monitoring level in N as in F. If ¯ u > ˜ vF, then the basic
wage in F is higher than in N, hence making work in N less attractive for
bad workers. This gives some additional protection to sector N and hence
allows principals in this sector to achieve full deterrence of bad workers with
a monitoring level slightly lower than the one used in sector F, albeit still
higher than the optimal monitoring level without bad workers.
With bad workers, the mission-oriented sector hence looses much of its wage
cost advantage compared to the for-proﬁt sector. The loss is particularly high
when θg > ∆q: in this case (case Ib in the above), the presence of bad workers
means that ﬁrms have to go from no monitoring at all to whatever monitoring
there is in the for-proﬁt sector. That is, by raising the level of monitoring,
destructive behavior in N becomes suﬃciently unattractive and bad workers
prefer to behave like regular workers in sector F. However, there is no need
for sector N to adapt its incentives otherwise, i.e., the optimal basic wage
stays the same as before, and overall incentives will still be equal to m∗
Nt∗
N.
Even with full deterrence of bad workers, the proﬁt in sector N therefore is
still higher than in sector F.
The expected proﬁt in N under full deterrence in both sectors is
π
det













N ) . (11)
Under which circumstances will there be no full deterrence in sector N? If





N = (1 − βN)(∆q − mNtN)
mNtN
a
− βND(θb − mNK)
1
a
+q − wN − M(mN) ,
subject to the limited liability and participation constraints of the workers as
given by (2) and (3). Similar as in sector F, his optimal monitoring level then
is mnd
N = βNDK/a, while the basic wage and the expected bonus payment







The expected proﬁt in N without full deterrence therefore is
π
nd























23Comparing (12) and (11), we ﬁnd that no full deterrence is the better strategy



















N ) − M(m
nd
N ) .
i.e., if the share of bad workers in sector N, βN, is lower and if additional
monitoring is very costly.
Proposition 5 : If there is full deterrence in F, then full deterrence in N
is optimal.
The reasons for this statement are straightforward: We know that F will
only prefer full deterrence if the expected damage from bad workers is large
enough, i.e., in particular if βF, the share of bad workers in F without full
deterrence, is high.
Note that βF is equal to the number of bad workers over all workers in sector
F, i.e., it is equal to xb/(xb + xr) if all bad workers (share xb in the overall
population) and all regular (share xr in the overall population) workers work
in F. Similarly, βN = xb/(xg + xb) if all bad workers choose to work in N,
which also attracts all good workers (share xg in the overall population).18
Since we assumed that xr > xg, xb/(xb + xr) < xb/(xb + xg). Hence if
full deterrence is optimal in F, then it must also be optimal in N since the
otherwise expected damage in N is even higher than in F. Also, as we have
seen above, the costs of full deterrence in N are lower than those in F.
If there is no full deterrence in F, whether N opts for full deterrence or not
depends on the share of bad workers in the overall population, xb, and the
cost of increased monitoring. When the expected damage from bad workers
is suﬃciently low or if a high level of monitoring is too costly, there will be
no full deterrence in N. However, N is more aﬀected by the presence of bad
workers since xg < xr and hence may opt for full deterrence even if there is
no full deterrence in F.
4 Ex Ante Control
The last section has shown that depending on the level of negative motivation
of bad workers, θb, ﬁrms may be able to deal with the problem by adapting
18If all bad workers prefer sector N over F, then βN = 0.
24their incentive schemes and in particular their monitoring levels. However,
this increase of ex post monitoring may be very costly, and for high levels
of negative motivation it becomes even entirely ineﬀective. Firms therefore
may want to invest in ex ante measures to reduce the probability of hiring a
bad worker in the ﬁrst place.
Some form of applicant screening, which may serve to ﬁlter out more trust-
worthy or motivated workers, is quite common in most ﬁrms. The higher
the expected damage of hiring a bad worker, the more an organization or
ﬁrm will be inclined to invest in a more sophisticated selection process of ap-
plicants. This is commonly observed especially in sectors where candidates,
once hired, are diﬃcult to ﬁre, as for example civil servants,19 or where the
stakes are high, e.g., in intelligence services. The selection process in these
cases can be quite lengthy and generally involves all kinds of tests and back-
ground checks. For instance, the CIA states on its web site:20 “Depending
on an applicant’s speciﬁc circumstances, the [application] process may take
as little as two months or more than a year. [...] Applicants must undergo
a thorough background investigation examining their life history, character,
trustworthiness, reliability and soundness of judgment [...], [their] freedom
from conﬂicting allegiances, potential to be coerced and willingness and abil-
ity to abide by regulations governing the use, handling and the protection of
sensitive information. The Agency uses the polygraph to check the veracity
of this information. The hiring process also entails a thorough medical exami-
nation of one’s mental and physical ﬁtness to perform essential job functions.”
The FBI states that “The clearance process can take anywhere from several
months to a year or more”,21 and lists as part of the background check “a
polygraph examination; a test for illegal drugs; credit and records checks; and
extensive interviews with former and current colleagues, neighbors, friends,
professors, etc.”
Similarly, many nonproﬁt organizations require a lot of previous experience
and conduct extensive interviews before hiring someone, especially in cases
where monitoring in the ﬁeld is diﬃcult (e.g., M´ edecins sans Fronti` eres).
A better candidate selection process can thus serve as a (partial) substitute
for worker monitoring.22 However, checking each applicant is costly, and
therefore has to be seen in relation to the potential damage of hiring a bad
19Goldman (1982) and Greenberg and Haley (1986) discuss this issue for the case of
judges in the United States.
20See https://www.cia.gov/careers/faq/index.html#a3
21See http://www.fbijobs.gov/61.asp#3
22See Huang (2007) and Huang and Cappelli (2006) for a discussion on the possible
tradeoﬀ between worker monitoring and ex ante applicant screening.
25worker.
In this context, legal requirements may play an important role in order to
help employers screen out bad workers. In Germany, for instance, employers
can ask applicants for their oﬃcial police record (“F¨ uhrungszeugnis”), which,
however, only documents oﬀenses that are punishable beyond a certain degree
of penalty in order to give oﬀenders a second chance. Unfortunately, until
recently, many potentially relevant cases of molestation, child pornography,
exhibitionism etc. did thus not appear in the records. This came under
discussion with the occurrence of several cases of child molestation where the
employer was unaware of his employee’s history, although the employee had
been convicted for similar behavior before. To prevent cases like this in the
future, the government introduced an “extended police record” (“erweitertes
F¨ uhrungszeugnis”), which can be requested for anyone seeking employment
in a job that may bring him or her in contact with children or youths.23
In other cases, establishing a clearer proﬁle of bad workers may help. This
has, for example, been done in the US to prevent ﬁre ﬁghter arson. Studies
by the South Carolina Forestry Commission and the FBI24 have found that
arsonists are typically white males between 17 and 26 years of age, with a
diﬃcult family background, lacking social and interpersonal skills, often of
average intelligence but with poor academic performance. Also, arson seems
to be more likely with volunteer ﬁre ﬁghters than with professionals who, in
the U.S. as well as in many European countries make up for only 25% of all
ﬁre ﬁghters. The South Carolina Forestry Commission hence has designed
an “Arson Screening and Prediction System” which is supposed to help ﬁeld
level administrators to evaluate candidates. It attributes a numeric score to
the answers to a questionnaire covering areas such as the candidate’s family
background, his social skills, capacity for self control, intelligence, self-esteem
and academic performance, stress and attitudes towards the ﬁre service.
Yet another measure to prevent destructive behavior may be to promote peer
monitoring, which is especially attractive if ex ante candidate screening is less
than perfect and monitoring of workers is diﬃcult. There are relatively few
theoretical papers on peer monitoring, exceptions being Barron and Gjerde
(1997) and Kandel and Lazear (1992), who both analyze the interaction
between peer pressure and the provision of incentives in teams. However,
empirical studies such as Knez and Simester (2001) and Hamilton, Nickerson,
23See press release of the German Ministry of Justice from 14 May 2009, http:
//www.bmj.bund.de/enid/Nationales_Strafrecht/Erweitertes_Fuehrungszeugnis_
1js.html .
24See Stambaugh and Styron (2003) for a summary of both studies.
26and Owan (2003) have found that team incentives and mutual monitoring
may indeed have positive eﬀects on workers’ eﬀort.
Depending on circumstances, diﬀerent practical measures may be appropriate
in order to introduce some extent of mutual monitoring. In the case of ﬁre
ﬁghter arson, for example, promoting peer monitoring consists of awareness
programs that are supposed to alert ﬁre departments to the problem and
keep their eyes open. In other cases, peer monitoring can be induced through
simple institutional features, such as letting employees work pairwise, as it
is common for police oﬃcers, hiring couples,25 or providing joint housing for
aid workers.26 While this may give rise to collusion among evil-doers, such a
scheme is likely to work reasonably well if there are enough“good”motivated
workers who care about the mission of the organization they work for.
5 Conclusion
We have shown how the existence of “destructive” workers who derive sat-
isfaction from actions that are detrimental to their employer or others may
aﬀect the optimal wage contracts oﬀered. In particular, we discussed how this
may aﬀect nonproﬁt organizations that rely at least to some extent on the
intrinsic motivation of their workers but may be unable to ﬁlter out workers
with a “negative” motivation.
First of all, we showed that without bad workers, the mission-oriented sector
N can save on wage and monitoring costs compared to the proﬁt-oriented
sector F. If the intrinsic motivation of good workers is high enough, it may
even forego bonus payments and monitoring altogether. However, the lack
of monitoring and extrinsic incentives makes N particularly vulnerable to
destructive behavior by bad workers: we showed that if bad workers join
sector N then only to follow their destructive instincts and not because they
want to provide a positive eﬀort.
In order to reduce the negative impact of bad workers, both the proﬁt- and the
mission-oriented sector have to increase their monitoring levels. We showed
25There is anecdotal evidence that, for example, the French service for teaching abroad
prefers to hire couples, not only for monitoring reasons, but mainly because they have
been found to withstand stress caused by a new environment better.
26This is for example the approach of ¨ Arzte f¨ ur die Dritte Welt (Doctors for Developing
Countries), a German NGO that runs several permanent projects in Africa, Asia and
Central America with the help of doctors doing short term volunteer work. Again, this
rather has practical reasons and is not necessarily intended as a measure to promote peer
monitoring, but still it may act in such a way.
27that to achieve full deterrence of bad workers, the proﬁt-oriented sector may
even have to increase eﬀort incentives beyond the optimal level as described in
Section 2, i.e., not only monitoring has to be increased, but also the expected
return for eﬀort mFtF is higher. By contrast, the mission-oriented sector can
achieve full deterrence by choosing the same monitoring level as in sector F,
but otherwise keeping extrinsic incentives at the same level as before. That
is, to the same extent that the monitoring level mN increases, the bonus
payment tN decreases such that the overall eﬀort incentives are still at their
optimal level m∗
Nt∗
N. The mission-oriented sector therefore still may enjoy a
certain cost advantage, since it is cheaper to get already motivated workers
to provide eﬀort.
However, increased monitoring of workers may be diﬃcult and expensive
under many circumstances, thus requiring ﬁrms to make a better ex ante
candidate selection.
In order to focus on the incentive problems raised by the presence of “bad”
workers, we have not taken into account other diﬀerences between proﬁt-
and mission-oriented organizations. Yet it may be worthwhile to take a
look at those diﬀerences, in particular the way organizations are ﬁnanced:
While proﬁt-oriented organizations usually have to survive on the proceeds
from their business, many mission-oriented organizations are run as non-
government organizations or associations that essentially depend on dona-
tions. For them, the scandal caused by bad workers may hence also have
considerable negative consequences for their funding, thus making deterrence
of bad workers all the more important.
Another aspect that needs to be discussed is the eﬀect of control on the intrin-
sic motivation of good workers. There is a recent literature on the crowding
out of intrinsic motivation by extrinsic incentives or control.27 Taking into
account such eﬀects would mean that the more the mission-oriented sector N
increases monitoring in order to prevent damage from bad workers, the lower
would be the intrinsic motivation of good workers. N would therefore also
have to increase his monetary eﬀort incentives tN in order to induce good
workers to work hard enough, thus losing its cost advantage. Eventually, good
intrinsic motivation would disappear all together and organizations in sector
N would operate under the same conditions as ﬁrms in the proﬁt-oriented
sector F and also oﬀer the same contracts.
However, it is unclear to what extent such crowding out of intrinsic motiva-
tion actually exists in the context considered here. Motivation crowding out
seems to be aﬀected by other factors than the level of monitoring, such as
27See Seabright (2009), Frey and Jegen (2001), Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997).
28framing and general treatment by the employer (Nagin, Rebitzer, Sanders,
and Taylor, 2002). As Akerlof and Kranton (2008) underline,“What matters
is not more or less monitoring per se, but how employees think of themselves
in relation to the ﬁrm” (Akerlof and Kranton (2008), p. 212). If it is made
clear that monitoring is increased in order to reduce fraud and anti-social
behavior, the motivation of good workers should therefore be not too much
aﬀected.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1




πij = q + (∆q − mitij)(mitij + θij)
1
a
− wij − M(mi) ,
subject to
(LL) wij ≥ w ,
(PC) uij = (mitij + θij)
2/(2a) + wij ≥ ¯ uj .
Let λLL and λPC be the respective Lagrange multipliers of the two con-




L = q + (∆q − mitij)(mitij + θij)
1
a
− wij − M(mi)
+ λLL(wij − w) + λPC(wij + (mitij + θij)
2/(2a) − ¯ uj) ,
29and the corresponding ﬁrst-order conditions are
∂L
∂wij












[∆q − 2mitij − θij + λPC(mitij + θij)] − M
′(mi) ≤ 0 ,(15)
∂L
∂λLL
= wij − w ≥ 0 , (16)
∂L
∂λPC
= wij + (mitij + θij)
2/(2a) − ¯ uj ≥ 0 , (17)
0 = λLL(wij − w) , (18)
0 = λPC(wij + (mitij + θij)
2/(2a) − ¯ uj) , (19)
From (13) follows immediately that at least one of the two constraints has
to be binding, i.e., it is not possible that λLL = λPC = 0. Indeed, if both
λLL = λPC = 0, (13) implies that the proﬁt of the principal could be increased
by reducing wij to its minimum legal level w, a contradiction with λLL = 0.
Furthermore, if (14) is binding, then (15) cannot be, unless mi = tij = 0.
The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to m is always smaller or equal to zero,
(i.e., ∂L
∂mi ≤ 0) so that the principal wants to set m as low as possible. We
deduce that m∗
i = m if extrinsic incentives for eﬀort are needed and m∗
i = 0
if no such incentives are needed.
We then get three cases:
Case I: (LL) binding, (PC) not binding
If the (LL) constraint is binding then λLL > 0 and wij = w. If the (PC) is
not binding then λPC = 0. By assumption 2, namely that ∆q2 ≥ 4aM(m),
the principal always wants to induce some eﬀort from the worker. Extrinsic
incentives are necessary only if θij is small. To be more speciﬁc, from (14) it
follows that mitij = max{0,(∆q − θij)/2} is optimal.
The principal’s payoﬀ then is
π
I
ij = q − w +
  1







− M(m) if ∆q ≥ θij
,
30and the agent’s payoﬀ is





ij if ∆q < θij
(∆q + θij)2/4 if ∆q ≥ θij
,
In the limit, if the agent’s reservation utility is equal to this payoﬀ, his





max{0,(∆q − θij)/2} + θij
 2
+ w .
This means that Case I is only relevant when the agent’s reservation utility
is ¯ uj ∈ [0,v(θij)].
Case II: (LL) binding, (PC) binding
If the (LL) constraint is binding (λLL > 0), then wij = w. If the (PC) is also
binding (λPC > 0), then from (17) follows that mitij =
 
2a(¯ uj − w) − θij
is optimal. For this to be a solution, it is necessary that mitij ≥ 0 which is
equivalent to ¯ uj ≥ w +
θ2
ij
2a. The agent’s payoﬀ is by construction
uij = ¯ uj .
The principal’s payoﬀ is
π
II




∆q + θij −
 
2a(¯ uj − w)
  
2a(¯ uj − w) − M(m) .
It is easy to check that πI
ij = πII
ij if ¯ uj = v(θij).
Case III: (LL) not binding, (PC) binding
If the (PC) constraint is binding (λPC > 0), then wij = ¯ uj−(mitij+θij)2/(2a).
If the (LL) constraint is not binding (λLL = 0), then wij > w. This implies
in (13) an interior solution so that λPC = 1. We deduce that if mi = m > 0,
by (14), we get mitij = ∆q. Plugging that into the participation constraint
which is binding we get wij = ¯ uj − (∆q + θij)2/(2a).
Note that for this it has to hold that ¯ uj − (∆q + θij)2/(2a) > w > 0. That





2 + w .
31The principal’s payoﬀ then is
π
III









which, under the assumption that ∆q2 ≥ 4aM(m), is higher than the proﬁt
achieved without monitoring (i.e., without extrinsic incentives πij = q−[¯ uj−
1
2a(θij)2]). The agent’s payoﬀ is by construction
uij = ¯ uj .






2 + q − M(m) .
Finally comparing πII
ij with πIII
ij it is easy to check that πII
ij = πIII
ij iﬀ ¯ uj =
˜ v(θij). The principal prefers Case III over Case II whenever the agent’s
outside utility exceeds ˜ v(θij).
This means that Case III is relevant when the agent’s reservation utility
is ¯ uj ∈ [˜ v(θij),¯ v(θij)], that case II is relevant when the agent’s reservation
utility is ¯ uj ∈ [v(θij),˜ v(θij)], and that Case I is relevant when the agent’s
reservation utility is ¯ uj ∈ [0,v(θij)].
To ﬁnish the proof, we have to make sure that the principal’s payoﬀ from each
scenario is positive. For this, q − w − M(m) > 0 is a suﬃcient assumption.
It also ensures that v(θij) ≤ ˜ v(θij) ≤ ¯ v(θij). QED
6.2 Calculating Automatic Deterrence in N
In order to calculate the level of automatic deterrence in N, ˜ ˜ θb, we have
to insert the relevant contracts both in sector N and F into (8). This is
equivalent to comparing the utility of a bad worker from eﬀort e in F with
his utility from eﬀort d in N.
Let us ﬁrst consider the case where θg > ∆q. Depending on the level of
reservation utility of the agents, Figure 4 indicates which of the cases derived
in Corollaries 1 and 2 is relevant in each sector and summarizes the resulting
utility levels uNb(d) and uFb(e) that can be achieved by bad workers. We
then have to compare each possible combination of utility levels in order to














Case I uFb(e) = w +
∆q2
8a
Case II uFb(e) = ¯ u
Case III uFb(e) = ¯ u vN
˜ vN
¯ vN




Case II uNb(d) = w +
(θb−mK)2
2a





Figure 4: Bad workers’ utility from positive eﬀort in F (i.e., uFb(e)) and
negative eﬀort in N (i.e., uNb(d)) for θg > ∆q.
in sector N overlaps with cases I, II and III in sector F. If we insert the
relevant values for mN,tN,wN as well as mF,tF,wF into (7), we ﬁnd that
˜ ˜ θb = ∆q/2 if ¯ u < vF and ˜ ˜ θb =
 
2a(¯ u − w) if vF < ¯ u < vN.
Similar comparisons have to be made for the remainder of cases, as well as
for a setting where θg < ∆q.
6.3 Proof of Proposition 2
The solution to the principal’s maximization problem with full deterrence
of bad workers is similar to the solution in the benchmark model. We can




= q + (∆q − θb + mFK) ·
θb − mFK
a
− wF − M(mF)








The corresponding ﬁrst-order conditions are
∂L
∂wF










(θb − mFK) . (21)
33Furthermore it has to hold that
0 = λLL(wF − w) (22)
0 = λPC(wF + (θb − mFK)
2/(2a) − ¯ uj) . (23)
As before, we get three cases:
Case I: (LL) binding, (PC) not binding
If the limited liability constraint is binding, λLL > 0, and given condition
(22) it follows immediately that the optimal basic wage in case I wI = w. If
the (PC) is not binding, then λPC = 0. Hence, from condition (21) it follows
that the optimal monitoring level mI
F has to be such that




′(mF) + 2mFK .
Case II: (LL) and (PC) binding
If both conditions are binding, then λLL > 0 and λPC > 0. Again, by
condition (22) we therefore have that the optimal wage in case II wII = w.






2a(¯ u − w)
K
.
Case III: (LL) not binding, (PC) binding
Since the limited liability constraint is not binding, λLL = 0 and hence by
(20) λPC = 1. Inserting this in (21), we get that the monitoring level in case
III mIII
F has to be such that the following holds:




′(mF) + mFK .









In all three cases k = I,II,III the optimal transfer level tk








34This is due to the fact that the deterrence constraint mFtF = θb − mFK is
binding.
Having calculated these three solutions, the question is, when each of them
is relevant, i.e., we have to calculate the critical values of the agent’s outside
utility delimiting the above three cases vFb, ˜ vFb and ¯ vFb.
Let us start with vFb which is deﬁned as the outside utility for which the






F = ¯ uj ,
has to hold, and hence vFb is deﬁned as
vFb ≡ (θb − m
I
FK)
2/(2a) + w .
Recall that vF = (m∗
Ft∗




θb > ˜ θb. Therefore vFb > vF.
Next, let us consider ˜ vFb, which deﬁnes the border between case II and III.
Case III is only relevant if ¯ uj − (θb − mIII
F K)2/(2a) > w > 0. That is, Case







2 + w .
For outside values above this one, case III holds. Note that the limited
liability constraint is trivially fulﬁlled if ¯ u > ˜ vFb. Again, since we consider
only cases where θb > ˜ θb and hence (θb − mIII
F K) > m∗
Ft∗
F, we get that
˜ vFb > ˜ vF.
Finally, ¯ vFb is deﬁned as the outside utility of the agent for which the prin-
cipal’s proﬁt in case III becomes zero, i.e., for which πIII
F = 0. That is:









+ (∆q − θb + m
III







F is such that




′(mF) + mFK .























(∆q − θb + m
III








35This expression is smaller than zero if









We assumed that M′(m) > 0 and M′′(m) > 0. Since we consider only
cases where θb > ˜ θb it holds that (θb − mIII
F K) > m∗
Ft∗
F = ∆q. Hence the
expression in brackets is negative and the above inequality is fulﬁlled. We
therefore know that ¯ vFb is decreasing in θb.
How high is ¯ vFb relative to ¯ vF? Recall that














F ) + M(m)
+(∆q − θb + m
III






As we have seen above, ¯ vFb is decreasing in θb, and the lowest value of θb for
which case III is actually relevant is θb = ˜ θb = ∆q+mK. If we plug this into
the above inequality, after some simpliﬁcation we ﬁnd that ¯ vFb > ¯ vF if
−M(m
III






2 > 0 .
Since mIII
F > m and M(·) is an increasing function of m, the left-hand side
of this inequality is negative, and we hence have shown by contradiction that
¯ vFb < ¯ vF must hold.
6.4 Proof of Proposition 3
The solution of the principal’s maximization problem when there are bad
workers follows the analysis in the benchmark model when there are only
good and regular workers. As we have seen, the principal’s maximization
problem without full deterrence corresponds to
max
wF,tF,mF
πF = q −wF − M(mF) + (1 − βF)(∆q − mFtF)
mFtF
a




36subject to the following constraints
(LL) wF ≥ w ,
(PC) (mFtF)
2/(2a) + wF ≥ ¯ uj .
Let again λLL and λPC be the respective Lagrange multipliers of the two con-




L(wF,mF,tF,λLL,λPC) = q − wF − M(mF)
+ (1 − βF)(∆q − mFtF)
mFtF
a
− βFD(θb − mFK)
1
a
+ λLL(wF − w) + λPC(wF + (mFtF)
2/(2a) − ¯ uj) ,
and the corresponding ﬁrst-order conditions are
∂L
∂wF

















= 0 . (26)
Furthermore, the following has to be true:
0 = λLL(wF − w) , (27)
0 = λPC(wF + (mFtF)
2/(2a) − ¯ uj) . (28)
Equation (25), i.e. ,the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to tF, is fulﬁlled if
the expression in square brackets is equal to zero. This implies that (26), the






and hence the optimal level of monitoring without full deterrence of bad
workers is mnd
F is such that M′(mnd
F ) = βFDK/a.
Note that no other change in extrinsic incentives is needed in order to account
for the presence of bad workers. In particular, eﬀort incentives for regular
workers can stay at the same level. The further solution of the problem
hence runs along the same lines as the proof of Proposition 1, except that the
optimal monetary transfer level tnd
F is adapted such that the overall incentives
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